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Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the Politics of Carbon Markets
This paper analyses the development of carbon markets: markets in permits to emit greenhouse gases or in credits earned by not emitting them. It describes briefly how such markets have come into being, and discusses in more detail two aspects of the efforts to 'make things the same' in carbon markets: how different gases are made commensurable, and how accountants have struggled to find a standard treatment of 'emission rights'. The paper concludes by discussing the attitude that should be taken to carbon markets (for example by environmentalists) and the possibility of developing a 'politics of market design' oriented to making such markets more effective tools of abatement.
3 In Callon's and Latour's view, economic life is 'performed' -framed and formatted -by 'economics at large', a term that encompasses not just the academic discipline but also economic practices such as accounting and marketing (Callon 1998 (Callon & 2007 . The characteristics of economic actors and of markets arise from, amongst other things, the 'dispositifs de calcul' (Callon and Muniesa 2003) -the calculative mechanisms -of which they are made up.
If the characteristics of 'capitalism' are not inherent, they can be changed by changing the calculative mechanisms that constitute it. The markets in greenhousegas emissions that are being constructed globally are a set of experiments (Muniesa and Callon 2007) in the validity of this prediction. Hitherto, greenhouse-gas emissions have been, in economists' familiar terminology, an 'externality': from the viewpoint of the emitter, they bore no cost, and so did not figure in emitters' economic calculations. The goal of a carbon market is to bring emissions within the frame of economic calculation by giving them a price. In such a market, emissions bear a cost: either a direct cost (because allowances to emit greenhouses gases need to be purchased), or an opportunity cost (because allowances that aren't used to cover emissions can be sold, or because credits can be earned if emissions are reduced below 'business as usual'). A carbon market is thus an attempt to change the construction of capitalism's central economic metric: profit and loss, the 'bottom line'.
The experiments in carbon-market construction have scarcely begun, so the validity of the prediction that capitalism can be 'civilized' (Latour forthcoming) by changing calculative mechanisms remains undecided. We do not yet know whether the bottom line will be changed to any substantial extent, in particular to an extent sufficient to keep global warming below the threshold (uncertain and fiercely contested, but often taken to be 2 o C) beyond which the risk of severe impacts rises sharply (Schellnhuber, 2006) .
In consequence, this paper is necessarily preliminary. The empirical material on which I am drawing is limited. It consists primarily of a set of 24 interviews conducted with people involved with carbon markets (particularly with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) as market designers, as carbon traders and brokers, or as members of NGOs seeking to influence the evolution of carbon markets. This interview material is supplemented by analysis of relevant documents such as monitoring reports and contributions to the debate in accountancy touched on below.
The article's main aim is simply to help broaden social-science research on carbon markets, both in terms of its disciplinary base (though their origins lie in economics, carbon markets cannot be understood by the conventional tools of that discipline alone) and in terms of its empirical focus. In that latter respect, I hope to show that it is productive to investigate not just overall questions such as the reasons why policy-makers might choose carbon markets rather than other tools to combat global warming, but also the specifics of how carbon markets are constructed.
Whether or not carbon markets are environmentally and economically effective depends on such specifics, and the issues involved are various and demand interdisciplinary treatment. One of the two topics examined below -how different gases are made commensurable -is a natural question for the social studies of science and technology; the other -how to find a standard treatment of 'emissions rights' -is a question obviously suitable for researchers in accounting. Although for reasons of space I do not discuss them here, questions for other disciplines can also easily be identified: for example, vastly more needs known about how emission reduction projects in developing countries actually work in practice, a question that raises issues ranging from how verification is conducted to the impact of projects on local communities and local environments. Investigating such issues in genuine depth required the skills of, amongst others, anthropologists and other area specialists.
Because the specifics of market design matter, I make no apology for the fact that this article touches upon matters of apparent detail. The commensurability of gases and the accounting treatment of emission rights are inevitably 'technical' questions, and those technicalities cannot altogether be avoided: they matter to overall outcomes. The commensurability of gases, for example, is crucial to how the world's two main existing carbon markets -the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism -interrelate, while there is at least tentative evidence that the accounting treatment of emissions rights affects 5 firms' behaviour in carbon markets. It is precisely issues of this detailed kind that an effective, inter-disciplinary analysis of carbon markets will need to address.
Carbon markets
Carbon markets come in two main species: 'cap and trade ' and 'project-based and 1980s, mainly in the United States (see, e.g., Hahn, 1989) . It was only in the 1990s that the idea became mainstream.
2 This article concentrates on regulatory markets, largely setting aside the 'voluntary' market, in which, for example, firms choose to 'offset' their emissions, even though they are under no compulsion to do so: see, for example, Bumpus and Liverman, (forthcoming) . 3 The history of emissions trading will be treated in more detail in MacKenzie (forthcoming, chapter 7).
The brief account given here draws upon that in MacKenzie (2007).
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The crucial development was the start of sulphur-dioxide trading in the US in 1995 (for which see, especially, Ellerman et al., 2000 and Burtraw et al. 2005) . It had been known for twenty years or more that damage to the environment and to human health was being caused by sulphur-dioxide emissions, notably from coal-fired power stations, which react in the atmosphere to produce 'acid rain' and other acid depositions. Numerous bills were presented to Congress in the 1980s to address the problem, but all failed in the face of opposition from the Reagan administration and from Democrats who represented states that might suffer economically from controls on sulphur dioxide, such as the areas of Appalachia and the mid west in which coal deposits are high in sulphur.
Sulphur trading broke the impasse. It combined a simple, clear goal that environmentalists could embrace (reducing annual sulphur-dioxide emissions from power stations in the US by ten million tons from their 1980 level, a cut of around a half) with a market mechanism attractive to at least some Republicans. The cut was achieved in practice far more cheaply than almost anyone had imagined. Industry lobbyists had claimed it would cost $10 billion a year, while the actual cost was around $1 billion. Allowance prices of $400 a ton were predicted, but in fact prices averaged around $150 or less in the early years of the scheme. The flexibility that trading gave to utilities helped to reduce costs (by around a half compared to having to meet a standard that imposed a uniform maximum emission rate: see Ellerman et al., 2000 and Burtraw et al., 2005) but other factors were equally important.
'Scrubbers' to remove sulphur from smokestacks turned out to be cheaper to install and to run than had been anticipated, and rail-freight deregulation sharply reduced the cost of transportation from Wyoming's Powder River Basin, the main source of lowsulphur coal in the United States (Ellerman et al., 2000) .
That the sulphur-dioxide market was, broadly, a success shaped how the from the combined heat and power plant are measured using a gas corrector meter (the interface of which is shown in figure 1 ) on the large pipe that takes gas from the national gas grid into the plant. It is called a 'corrector meter' because it samples temperature and pressure, and can thus convert volumes into masses of gas input, which are in turn converted to estimates of CO 2 output using standard multiplication factors.
Zhejiang Juhua Co. is involved in something quite different, the manufacture of HCFC-22 (chlorodiflouromethane), which is used mainly as a refrigerant (especially in air conditioners), though also as a foam blower and as a chemical feedstock. The standard process used to produce chlorodiflouromethane involves combining hydrogen fluoride and chloroform, using antimony pentachloride as a catalyst, and even when optimized the process leads to a degree of 'overfluoridation':
5 On commensuration in the SO 2 market, see Levin and Espeland (2002) .
trifluoromethane, HFC-23, is produced as well. 6 HFC-23 is, unfortunately, long-lived in the atmosphere and an efficient absorber of infrared radiation; the combination makes it a very potent greenhouse gas.
Until recently, the HFC-23 was discharged into the atmosphere. Now, the Zhejiang Juhua plant's waste gases are fed into a specialised incineration furnace imported from Japan, in which they are mixed with hydrogen, compressed air and steam, burned at 1200 0 C using a high-intensity vortex burner, and thus converted to hydrogen fluoride, carbon dioxide and hydrogen chloride. These products pass through a quencher (in which they are cooled rapidly to minimise the formation of dioxins), and the resultant acid solution is either sold or disposed of via a facility for treating fluoric waste (CDM Executive Board 2007).
As already noted, to gain approval it must be shown that a Clean Development
Mechanism project reduces emissions below the 'baseline' level they would have had in the absence of the project, which in many cases is a tricky exercise in establishing a credible counterfactual (Lohmann 2005) : for an introduction to the issues involved, see Michaelowa (2005) . In the case of HFC-23 decomposition, however, a straightforward argument has sufficed: without the decomposition process, the HFC- establishment of authoritative scientific knowledge about climate change (see Agrawala 1998 a & b) . As the IPCC put it in 1990, GWP is '[a]n index ... which allows the climate effects of the emissions of greenhouse gases to be compared. The GWP depends on the position and strength of the absorption bands of the gas, its lifetime in the atmosphere, its molecular weight and the time period over which the climate effects are of concern' (Houghton, Jenkins and Ephraums 1990, p. 45) .
Although very similar notions are to be found in the scientific literature of the time (see, e.g., Lashof and Ahuja 1990) , it was the IPCC itself that gave 'global warming potential' its canonical definition:
x designates the gas in question (e.g. HFC-23). a x is an estimate of the effect on the radiation balance at the tropopause (the boundary of the upper and lower atmosphere)
of an increase in the amount of gas in the atmosphere, an effect measured in watts per square metre per kilogram. x(t) is the mass of the gas that will remain in the atmosphere at time t from l kg released at time zero. TP is the overall time period in question: in the calculation in the HFC-23 commensuration, it is 100 years. The denominator is the equivalent integral for the reference gas, CO 2 . The 'exchange rate' of 11,700 used to translate HFC-23 into CO 2 is thus an example of 'black-boxing' in the sense of Callon and Latour (1981) and MacKenzie (1990, p. 26) . GWPs could be contested in at least two senses. First, whether GWPs really give the best estimates of the climatic effects of different gases could be and has been challenged (see Shackley and Wynne, 1997 , and also Shine et al., 2005 , and the literature cited in the latter): for example, the choice of a 100-year time period is in a sense arbitrary, and very different GWPs can be generated if, for example, 25, 50 or 500 years is used. 11 Second, GWP estimates were acknowledged to be subject to significant uncertainties, of the order of +/-35 percent (Houghton et al., 1996, p. 73 and p. 119 It is perfectly possible, however, that this black-boxing may become harder in the future. At the time of the Kyoto Protocol, it is unlikely that anyone imagined that temperature, because of large differences in the time constants of the various greenhouse gases.
Although a strong greenhouse gas with a short lifetime could have the same GWP as a weaker greenhouse gas with a longer lifetime, identical (in mass terms) pulse emissions of the two gases could cause a different temperature change at a given time. Economists have also criticised the GWP concept for not being based on an analysis of damages caused by the emissions' (Shine et al., 2005, p. 282). successor to Kyoto, however, the financial consequences of such figures can now be seen. It is possible that GWPs will remain in practice unchallenged -it would be very hard, given the diversity of economic interests involved, to get agreement on a measure other than GWPs, or on anything other than the IPCC's estimates of them (which are a 'focal point' in game-theoretic terms), so no party to the negotiations may attempt to do so -but it is not a foregone conclusion.
Making things the same: 'Emission rights'
Gases are thus made the same by a combination of measurement devices, complex natural science, and the capacity (at least so far) of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change to keep the estimation of global warming potentials bracketed off from carbon-market politics. But practices of many other kinds are also needed to make 'carbon' fungible, and amongst these accounting is of particular importance.
12
The European allowances that Edinburgh University needs to emit carbon dioxide and the CERs generated by Zhejiang Juhua Co. are items that Europe's (or indeed China's) accountants have not previously encountered. What kind of items are they?
What accounting treatment should they receive? These questions are significant for the operation of carbon markets, since accounting makes economic items visible, and whether and how it does so is consequential. Hatherly, Leung and MacKenzie (forthcoming) argue that a 'finitist' perspective is useful for the analysis of accounting, especially of accounting classification, and it is particularly appropriate here. In this perspective, how to classify an item (not just an accounting item, but an item of any kind) is always implicitly a choice. Past classifications -which are always finite in number, hence 'finitism' -influence present classifications by analogy ('this item is like previous items we classified as X, so this should be classified as an X'), but do not determine them.
Of course, classification often does not feel like a choice. Classifiersbookkeepers, accountants, ornithologists, botanists, and so on -often, probably normally, come across items that seem familiar and simply 'see' them as an X ('this is an X', not 'I am classifying this as an X'). Items that seem to classifiers to be unfamiliar are thus of particular analytical interest, because they make implicit choice explicit. Instead of relying on habit and routine, those involved have consciously and
explicitly to decide what classification is appropriate, and the debate that is often sparked can reveal the contingencies that affect classification.
In the run-up to the launch of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC), a subsidiary body of the International Accounting Standards Board, discussed how to apply accounting standards to the new items, which it called 'emission rights', which were about to come into being. What kind of items were they? For example, were they indeed 'rights'? The IFRIC concluded that they were not: 'an allowance itself does not confer a right to emit. Rather it is the instrument that must be delivered in order to settle the obligation that arises from emissions ' (IFRIC 2004, p. 19 ). 14 14 'It therefore follows that a participant in a cap and trade scheme does not consume the economic benefits of an allowance as a result of its emissions. Rather a participant realises the benefits of that allowance by surrendering it to settle the obligation that arises from producing emissions (or by selling it to another entity). Therefore, the IFRIC observed that amortisation, which is the systematic allocation of the cost of an asset to reflect the consumption of the economic benefits of that asset over its useful life, is incompatible with the way the benefits of the allowances are realised. The withdrawal of IFRIC 3 means that it remains permissible to treat carbon in this way: as inside an economic frame, but in a sense invisibly so, since no accounting recognition is needed if the above conditions are met. A survey by Deloitte (2007) found that some market participants were doing just that. Others were in effect following IFRIC 3, while others again were doing so partially, treating the provision for the liability created by emissions in a different way. 17 The attempt to make 'emission rights' the same has, in this sense, so far failed.
The partial invisibility of carbon also means that the incorporation of the carbon price into the market's 'calculative mechanisms' (Callon and Muniesa 2003) is only partial. Although it is impossible to be certain, there is tentative evidence from my interview data of effects of both the accounting visibility of carbon in some firms and its invisibility in others. Consider, for example, the effect of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on electricity prices. If allowances are distributed free, one might naïvely think that they should have no effect on the price of electricity. If a generator is given enough allowances to cover its emissions (most generators have actually had to buy some allowances, but let me set that aside), what 17 Deloitte (2007) does not estimate the relative prevalence of the three forms of accounting treatment.
Those in the third category 'recognise a provision on the following bases:
• To the extent that the entity holds a sufficient number of allowances, the provision should be recognized based on the carrying value of those allowances (i.e., the cost to the entity of extinguishing their obligation)
• To the extent that the entity does not hold a sufficient number of allowances, the provision should be recognized based on the market value of emission rights required to cover the shortfall; and
• The penalty that the entity will incur if it is unable to obtain allowances to meet their obligations under the scheme, and it is anticipated that the penalty will be incurred (note that the obligation to deliver allowances must still be fulfilled).' (Deloitte 2007, p. 3) 20 it charges customers surely shouldn't change? An economist will quickly tell you what's wrong with that argument. As already noted, there's an opportunity cost involved. In a 'perfect market', a profit-maximizing firm will produce electricity only if the price it receives is greater than what it can earn by not generating electricity and selling its stocks of the required inputs: its coal, its gas, and now its carbon allowances (Point Carbon 2007, pp 24-25) . If its allowances can command a nonzero price, the price of electricity must rise correspondingly.
According to an interviewee in the electricity market, however, it has required accountants to give force to this economists' reasoning. The 'naïve' view prevailed in Carbon has thus been 'visible' for some time in the electricity sector. When, in contrast, carbon is kept invisible in accounting terms effects of three kinds can be anticipated. The first, which is hypothetical (I have no direct evidence on the point),
would be to undermine a major desired effect of a carbon market: incentivizing even those companies who have 'enough' allowances to cut their emissions so as to generate income by selling allowances. For this effect to be realised, allowances need to be seen as assets with potential monetary value, not simply as means of complying with regulatory requirements. The second, related effect (of which there is some tentative evidence) is to delay the sale of allowances by those who, even without abatement, have more allowances than they need. The sale of allowances -and also lending allowances for short sale -means that they can no longer be kept invisible.
They must be recognized in accounting terms, and, for example, a tax liability may be crystallized. This disincentive may reinforce other reasons for not selling, such as the fact that emission levels will in general be known in advance only approximately and the lack of a culture of proprietary, risk-taking trading in many industrial companies (in contrast to electricity suppliers, which are active traders) that would permit the sale of allowances that probably -but not certainly -will not be needed.
My interview data do not permit me to judge the relative importance of the various reasons for postponing the sale of allowances that are likely to be surplus to requirements, but those interviewees with whom I explored the topic all believed delayed sale to be a real phenomenon. It has been consequential because the complex process of setting national allocations for the first phase (January 2005 to December 2007) of the European scheme led to over-allocation of allowances. The extent of over-allocation was, however, not clear initially, and the failure of those who were 'long' allowances to bring them to market led to a constriction of supply, which helped market prices to rise to €31/tonne (see figure 2) . Curiously, when the extent of over-allocation became clear in the spring of 2006, prices -though plunging dramatically -did not initially fully reflect the fact that allowances no longer had any significant economic value. It took several months for the market price of a phaseone European allowance to fall close to zero (only in 2007 did prices become in effect 22 zero, with allowances towards the end of the year costing less than €0.10/tonne).
Interviewees suggested that delayed sale by those who were 'long' allowances accounts for this paradoxical behaviour of the carbon price. Even though it was clear that allowances were intrinsically close to worthless (because, in aggregate, there were more of them than would be needed), they still commanded a price of several euros, because not enough were brought to market.
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The third -again hypothetical -effect of the accounting invisibility of carbon may be to strengthen the hand of managers whose interests lie in protecting market share by not passing on to customers the opportunity cost of allowances that have been allocated free, even when passing on the cost is profit-maximizing for their firms. The extent to which firms pass on the opportunity cost is crucial to the environmental effects of a cap-and-trade market -if they pass it on, there is likely to be carbon 'leakage' from the scheme, as imports from outside its boundaries become more attractive -and there is fierce controversy over likely behaviour in this respect.
Economists tend to predict profit-maximization, cost pass-through and thus leakage, while firms themselves tend to argue that market share will be protected and costs will not be passed through, at least in full. Unfortunately, empirical analysis of the Emissions Trading Scheme so far is too limited to be confident how firms outside the electricity sector have behaved in this respect: see Carbon Trust (2008).
The politics of carbon markets
One could go deeper into the issue of fungibility, of making things the same. A trade, for example, is a legal transaction requiring documentation, and with three bodies (the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the European Federation of Energy Traders, and the International Emissions Trading Association) competing in this sphere, interviewees reported that it has taken orchestrated action to reduce the differences to a level at which a trade documented in one format can be regarded as similar enough to one documented in another, for example for one to be used to hedge the other. There has also, for instance, been sharp criticism from competitors of the efforts by Barclays Capital, a leading player in the carbon market, to standardise 23 CERs via its SCERFA (Standard CER Forward Agreement). The competitors regard a SCERFA as specific to Barclays, not as a 'standard' entity.
Instead, however, let me consider the question of the attitude to be taken to carbon markets. There is a great deal of suspicion of them, ranging from rightwing distaste for emissions caps to leftwing hostility to an extension of market relations.
The efforts at market construction so far have led to some environmental benefitsfor example, because of HFC-23's potency, curbing emissions of it is very valuablebut also significant problems. There has, for example, been only modest abatement by Europe's electricity producers (the sharp rise in gas prices in 2005-6 swamped any carbon-price incentive to switch from coal to gas), while the mechanism discussed above led them, as noted, to make substantial windfall profits.
Similarly, the large sums that can be earned by decomposing HFC-23 also over and above 2000-4 levels) is currently not eligible for CDM credits, but the consequence is that there is no economic incentive not simply to discharge HFC-23 from such new production into the atmosphere rather than decomposing it.
In the light of issues such as these, it is tempting to conclude that carbon markets are inherently flawed means of achieving abatement. Similarly, political constraints mean that if international agreement on a replacement for the Kyoto Protocol can be reached, it is likely to include something similar to the Clean Development Mechanism. The CDM is, as noted, a result of the need to secure developing-country participation in abatement efforts in a context in which the developing world was and is unwilling to take on caps: even caps postponed to a later date, given the risk that by then many of the cheaper opportunities for abatement might be exhausted. The reluctance is understandable, given the desire not to allow a problem caused by the industrialized countries to serve as a brake upon development, and it is likely to persist -even in a context in which China, in particular, no longer fits the traditional template of a developing country.
Abatement efforts in the developing world are thus likely to continue to require funding from the developed world. Of course, such funding could be achieved by direct government aid - Wara (2007) points out that HFC-23 decomposition could have been achieved far more cheaply via this route than via the CDM -but that again 25 raises the question of whether governments would in practice make the requisite large transfers of resources.
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To conclude that carbon markets must fail may also be unduly pessimistic, in that it would miss the extent to which carbon markets hitherto have been experimental, in the case of phase 1 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, quite explicitly so: interviewees involved in establishing it reported the many compromises that had to be made to get it up and running, such as the fact that it was possible to challenge only the most egregiously over-generous national allocations of allowances. While existing carbon markets unquestionably have major flaws, those flaws are increasingly becoming manifest, and ways of remedying them are available.
Thus, windfall profits within the European scheme could be eliminated by moving from free allocation to full auctioning (Dales's original proposal), and there is now a real possibility that this will happen from 2013 on, at least in the electricity sector. Such efforts are too recent and too limited to know whether they will be successful. However, it is worth noting that changes in market design of a kind that seem potentially achievable could be consequential. Take the underlying issue of a carbon market versus a carbon tax. Many environmental activists prefer the latter, as do some economists such as Nordhaus (2007) . Nordhaus argues that the classic analysis by Weitzman (1974) of the conditions that influence the relative efficiency of 'quantity-based' instruments (such as a cap-and-trade scheme) and 'price-based' instruments (such as a carbon tax) suggests, given the specific cost-benefit features of combating global warming, the superior efficiency of a carbon tax.
Yet carbon markets seem politically feasible, even in the US; carbon taxes may not be, even in Europe. Intriguingly, however, a cap-and-trade market, with full auctioning rather than free allocation, can be equivalent to an optimally set tax. In both, polluters pay, either by having to buy permits or by paying the carbon tax.
Indeed, under admittedly 'idealized conditions' (Hepburn 2006, p. 229 ) they pay the same amounts, and the environmental outcomes are the same. Thus, if the relationship between emission levels and the carbon price is known with certainty, either a cap-and-trade market or a correctly set tax can achieve a required level of abatement, and the necessary tax rate will be the same as the allowance price. Of course, the relationship between emission levels and the carbon price is not known with certainty, and for that and other reasons the full equivalence between tradable permits and a tax does not pertain in the real world. However, economists' analyses 27 suggest ways of designing a carbon market that might make it and a tax more closely equivalent in practice. These include rules facilitating the 'banking' of permits for future use and the 'borrowing' of permits from future years, regulated perhaps by an adjustable requirement for firms to hold a certain amount of permits in reserve, analogous to the adjustable reserves that banks are required to hold (Newell, Pizer and Zhang 2005) .
Precisely because of the similarity of auctioning to a carbon tax, emissions markets seem almost always initially to involve free allocation, because this reduces lobbying against them and political opposition. However, once markets are wellestablished, as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme now is, shifting to auctioning may become easier (especially now the 'economic experiment' of Phase I of the ETS has made publicly visible the problems that free allocation leads to). For example, in October 2007 Sweden announced that it was ending free allocation of allowances to its electricity and heat sectors. 24 Indeed, as noted above, it seems increasingly likely that in the third phase of the ETS, from 2013 onwards, auctioning may be much more heavily employed, at least for sectors such as electricity that cannot in practice easily move production outside of the European Union.
The effort to shift the ETS to auctioning is 'politics' of a classic, recognizable kind, involving governments, the policy makers of a supranational body, nation-state representatives, fierce industry lobbying against auctioning, and so on. Not all the politics of carbon markets, however, fit that recognizable template. Neither the IPCC nor the International Accounting Standards Board see themselves as political bodies, and indeed it is of particular importance that the former not be seen as political, despite the efforts of its critics to paint it as such. Yet they are arguably locales of 'subpolitics' in Beck's sense: politics 'outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states' (Beck 1996, p. 18; see Holzer and Sørensen 2003) . For example, the IFRIC and now the International Accounting Standards Board (which is turning its attention to emission rights) have to contend with pressure that has had the effect of blocking efforts to 'make things the same' in The subpolitics of carbon markets may seem esoteric, and it is certainly not simple, but it is important. Clearly, such markets are only one tool for combating global warming, and other tools are also important: direct regulation, carbon taxes (where these are feasible), greatly increased public expenditure on research and development and on necessary infrastructure (for example, the electricity grid changes needed to make increased renewables production more attractive economically), the removal of the many subsidies for fossil-fuel extraction and use, and so on (see, for example, Lohmann 2006 and Prins and Rayner 2007) . Nevertheless, making carbon markets more effective is crucial, and the esoteric nature of their subpolitics means that researchers have a particularly salient role to play in bringing to light matters of apparent detail that in fact play critical roles in this respect.
It is this author's hope that this paper will encourage the work of this kind that is so badly needed. The existing and planned experiments in changing capitalism's bottom line are heterogeneous, widely diffused worldwide, and involve many aspects -scientific, technological, political, accounting, sociological, anthropological, geographical -beyond economics as narrowly conceived. The experiments need 'witnesses' (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985) , and those witnesses must be multiple: lay as well as professional, from many countries, and if they are academics from many disciplines. 25 Carbon markets need to become part of a process of 'social learning' (qv Williams, Stewart and Slack 2005) , in which institutions to mitigate climate change are created, evaluated and reshaped. 26 Such multiple witnessing and social 25 I owe this way of formulating the matter to Andrew Barry. 26 There is of course a trade-off between the need to evaluate and improve a market's design and the need for rules that are stable over reasonably long time periods. The European Union's trade-off seems reasonable -an explicitly experimental three-year initial phase, then a five-year second phase, followed by a third phase that is likely to last eight years .
29 learning needs to concern not just the overall futures of carbon markets, but the crucial 'nuts and bolts' of their construction, questions such as how different carbon sources and sinks are commensurated, how allowances are treated in accounting terms, and many other such matters that I have been unable to discuss for space reasons. If this modest paper recruits others to take part in this multiple witnessing and social learning, then it will have achieved its goal. 
